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**1962/10/30**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY  
G/PM

**EXCISE** (15)

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MEMORANDUM

October 30, 1962

SUBJECT: Comments on Items III and IV of the  
Agreed Agenda for the State-Defense  
Meeting of October 30

The key problems for immediate decision are the modalities for removal of the offensive weapons in Cuba and verification that no additional ones are imported. Longer run arrangements will depend importantly upon the nature and functioning of these short term expedients. Nonetheless, we must consider also the longer term requirements and arrangements which we desire.

Long term verification requirements must be two criteria: they must provide reasonable assurance against clandestine introduction of nuclear delivery systems into Cuba or other countries covered by these arrangements, and they must limit our freedom of action as little as possible. We are seeking to modify the Brazilian Resolution in order to avoid limitations on our transporting nuclear weapons through the demuclearized zone, but our main effort may have to be made at the time that Latin American and possible African regional conferences convene to establish specific arrangements implementing this Resolution. One solution for the problem in Latin America is to have the OAS set up a demuclearized zone applying to territory under the jurisdiction of all members of the OAS (with covers Cuba whether or not it attends the conference and concurs). Such an arrangement could apply to "all American Republics which did not possess such capability at the date on which they adhered" to the Rio Treaty.

[REDACTED]

future members.

Verification  
Inspection could be called into operation upon the allegation by any American Republic that another member state was failing to comply with, or was preparing to violate, the above undertaking, and could obligate that state to permit without delay duly qualified observers to enter its territory for the purpose of verifying the allegation. Interim UN arrangements would presumably remain until such regional arrangements could go into effect.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *ABH* DATE *2/10/88*

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IS/PFC/COR 7 413/92 Date: 4/13/92

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The second major problem in connection with long term arrangements concerns the extent of US or Hemispheric guarantees not to invade Cuba, and obligations by Cuba in addition to denuclearization. One solution to this problem is for the US to give no assurances beyond those contained in the President's statement of October 27, and not to specify particular obligations required of Cuba. On the other hand, Khrushchev has in his message of October 23 already given a broader interpretation to the President's statement than was intended, and for the US to leave the matter in limbo would tend to confirm Khrushchev's unqualified and broad interpretation of our pledge. In net, we think it would be preferable to include, in either a US or probably an OAS statement or resolution, undertaking to reaffirm the obligations they have assumed in the Charter of the UN and the Charter of the OAS not to have recourse to the use of force in their international relations except in the case of individual or collective self defense or in accordance with existing treaties. This would permit freedom of action to the US and OAS in dealing with any situation in which we conclude that Castro was engaged in direct or indirect aggression against any part of or the whole of the Western Hemisphere. This could be made clear without being made so explicit as to unduly tie our hands in the future. The other alternative would be to tie our existing non-invasion pledge merely to continuing compliance with denuclearization; this would appear, however, to be more constrained on future freedom of action than the vague non-aggression assurance.

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The US should not, of course, assume any obligations not to assist insurrection against Castro, and should not commit itself on support to anti-Castro Cubans beyond reaffirmations of our UN and OAS Charter obligations.

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